This post was written by John B. Berringer and Michael N. DiCanio.
In a recent decision Magistrate Judge David A. Baker rejected insurance company Daubert motion to exclude the expert testimony of an architect, a structural engineer, and an accountant designated in an insurance coverage case. Bray & Gillespie v. Hartford et al, Case No. 6:07-cv-00326 –DAB (M.D. Fla. April 20, 2009).
The defendants’ had moved to exclude the testimony of B&G’s accountant and his conclusions regarding the amount of business interruption loss suffered. They did not challenge the methodology of his calculations, but rather took issue with the fact that he allegedly used the wrong numbers and did not provide a period of restoration. Denying the motion, Judge Baker held that this was not a proper ground for excluding the testimony under Daubert, see Quiet Technology, 326 F.3d at 1345-46 (using incorrect numbers in a reliable formula is not grounds for exclusion), and held that the particular issue of limiting the damage calculation with respect to a period of restoration is a matter of factual and legal dispute in this case.
The defendants’ also attacked the proposed testimony of B&G’s architect as unreliable, alleging that he misapplied the pertinent development codes. The court denied the motion, holding:
Interpreting code requirements and estimating building damage and repair or rebuild costs is exactly the sort of thing architects do, well within an architect’s expertise for Daubert purposes. To the extent Defendants disagree with his analysis or find it factually unsupportable, they can challenge these conclusions by cross examination or offer the testimony of their own expert witness, and the jury can decide the matter by weighing the testimony of the competing experts.
Finally, the defendants argued that B&G’s engineering expert could not testify as to the existence of mold and asbestos in a building, could not rely upon second-hand knowledge to make conclusions and should have performed all testing personally. Denying these arguments, Judge Baker found that a professional engineer is qualified to testify as to a generally accepted proposition such as the existence of mold and asbestos in a building. In addition, the court held that defendants’ remaining arguments regarding the expert’s first hand knowledge were not a proper Daubert challenge:
There is no requirement that an expert has to have first hand information as to all relevant facts and verify same; nor is there a requirement that the expert must perform all testing personally. Just as a physician may reliably interpret an X-ray taken by a technician, a Professional Engineer is qualified, by training and experience, to review the work of others and opine to matters within his expertise. To the extent Defendants find fault with the assumptions underlying the opinions, that is not an attack on the methodology, but on the application of an established methodology to a disputed set of facts.
Trial is scheduled for September 14, 2009.