If an insurance company owes a duty to defend, the dispute should be decided promptly, on the pleadings. Any delay undermines the duty to defend. The scope of the duty to defend should be adjudicated on the pleadings as quickly as possible to give policyholders the true value of their policies and the benefit of their contracts.

The value and purpose of the duty to defend

The duty to defend is one of the most valuable components of an insurance policy. Like it or not, American society is litigious. Companies cannot prevent lawsuits through good conduct, laudable intentions, or strong compliance programs.  Refuting liability and damages is expensive even if the core facts are undisputed or the case is frivolous.

For a single company or individual, the frequency and size of litigation generally is unpredictable, making budgeting for defense costs a difficult task.  In any single year, the risk of litigation is low, but when a claim does come in, defense costs can be significant.  This litigation landscape is a problem for legal departments trying to budget or reserve for litigation costs.

The duty to defend addresses this problem using the principles of risk transfer and risk pooling.

  • Risk transfer: the risk and costs of defending litigation is transferred to the insurance company in exchange for a premium payment.
  • Risk pooling: the insurance company takes the collective risks of litigation against all policyholders in a pool large enough that aggregate defense costs can be statistically analyzed and predicted on an annual basis.

This way no one has to assess the risk that any individual company is sued or anticipate those defense costs. Policyholders can include insurance premium costs in their legal budgets, and shift covered defense costs onto the insurer. The insurance company underwriters can evaluate the aggregate defense spend at a gross systemic level and charge premiums to cover those costs (with a healthy profit margin).Continue Reading The duty to defend requires an early judgment

Faced with mounting claims for insurance coverage as a result of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak, commercial insurers are likely to search for any policy provision that they think will enable them to avoid paying virus-related claims.  One provision that insurers ultimately may invoke in an attempt to deny such claims is the so-called “pollution exclusion” – an exclusion that can be found in both commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies and property insurance policies.  Policyholders should anticipate such an argument and should not walk away from insurance claims just because of it.  Although the exclusion is often broadly worded, there is generally good reason not to read it to preclude coverage for third-party claims and/or first-party losses involving viruses, including COVID-19.

While the exact language of the pollution exclusion may differ from one policy to another, it typically provides that there is no insurance for “bodily injury” and/or “property damage” that “would not have occurred in whole or in part but for the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of ‘pollutants’ at any time.”  Again, while its precise definition can vary among policies, “pollutant” is typically defined as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.”Continue Reading Pollution exclusion should not preclude coverage for virus-related claims

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has made it harder for policyholders to prevail on claims of common law bad faith against insurers in that state. In State of West Virginia ex rel. State Auto Property Insurance Companies v. Stucky, No. 17-0257, 2017 WL 4582607 (W. Va. Oct. 10, 2017), West Virginia’s highest court held that an insurance company cannot be held liable for bad faith regardless of its dilatory conduct, so long as it ultimately defends and indemnifies its policyholder.  As the dissent in Stucky observed, however, “[t]his over-simplified approach is myopic.”

In Stucky, the policyholder was a construction company that allegedly damaged a couple’s home.  The construction company, though, believed it “was insured for the damage to the … property under a commercial general liability policy ….”

Although the company’s insurer initially agreed “that it would handle the claim,” the insurer nevertheless allegedly “conducted a series of inspections and investigations, thereby delaying a potential settlement of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, increasing the amount of the plaintiffs’ property damage, and resulting in the lawsuit filed against [the construction company] by the plaintiffs.”Continue Reading “Myopic” ruling limits policyholders’ ability to recover for common law bad faith in West Virginia

The interpretation and application of a pollution exclusion in a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy is often a fact-specific and jurisdiction-specific exercise. That said, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision, applying North Dakota law and interpreting such an exclusion in a CGL policy, should command the attention of the entire natural gas industry.

At issue in Hiland Partners GP Holdings, LLC, et al. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 15-3936 (8th Cir. Jan. 31, 2017), was an explosion at a natural gas processing facility that “receives gas and hydrocarbon products and processes them into byproducts for sale.”  Appellants, who owned and operated the facility, were an additional insured under a third party’s CGL policy.
Continue Reading Eighth Circuit pollution-exclusion opinion a cautionary tale for natural gas industry

Insurance requirements in commercial agreements and corresponding additional insured provisions in insurance policies are important tools to manage and transfer risks. However, far too often those efforts are thwarted by inattention and, in some cases, sloppiness. As exemplified by the disastrous outcome for the contracting parties in Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Vita Food Products, Inc., No. 13 C 05181 (E.D. Ill. January 30, 2015), there are many pitfalls to successfully transfer risk and secure additional insured coverage.
Continue Reading Harmonizing Risk Transfer: Avoiding Pitfalls With Additional Insured Provisions