On the heels of last year’s special session on Florida’s property insurance crisis, which, among other things, eliminated one-way fee shifting in property insurance cases, the Florida Legislature has now passed even more aggressive pro-insurer legislation as part of a broader tort reform bill aimed at addressing “frivolous” litigation. House Bill 837 is not limited to property insurance issues, and instead includes various measures aimed at protecting insurance companies from liability for bad faith conduct and prevailing party attorney fees across all kinds of coverage disputes. HB 837 raises several important issues for policyholders and insurance litigation overall going forward. We discuss some of these issues below.

Fee-shifting allowed only in certain declaratory judgment actions

First, HB 837 appears to extend last year’s fee-shifting repeals to all lines and types of insurance coverage disputes, not just property insurance disputes, while creating a new limited fee-shifting statute for certain kinds of insurance disputes brought as declaratory judgment actions. This would allow for fee-shifting in declaratory judgment actions brought after an insurer has made a “total coverage denial.” The phrase “total coverage denial” is not defined, but according to the bill, would not include situations where a liability insurer provides a defense under a reservation of rights. The bill does not say whether an insurer who also claims a right to reimbursement for defense costs paid on the insured’s behalf effectively seeks a total denial of coverage.

Continue Reading Key issues for policyholders under Florida’s new tort reform bill 

Most residential property policies provide for an “appraisal” as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism when the insurer concedes coverage for a loss in whole or part, but the amount of the loss is disputed. The resulting appraisal award is binding on the parties absent certain limited grounds for challenging the award or the insurer’s obligation to pay it in full. Once issued, absent any cognizable challenge, an insurer must timely pay the award—often within 30 days by contract—subject to any applicable sub-limits, deductibles, or other policy limitations. Florida law has long held that where an insured is forced to file suit to compel appraisal or recover policy benefits and an appraisal later ensues, an insurer’s payment of the resulting appraisal award operates as a “confession of judgment”—the functional equivalent of a judgment in the insured’s favor sufficient to trigger the insured’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party under Sections 627.428 (for admitted insurers) or 626.9373 (for surplus lines insurers) of the Florida Statutes. Bryant v. GeoVera Specialty Ins. Co., 271 So. 3d 1013, 1019-20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); Jerkins v. USF & G Specialty Ins. Co., 982 So. 2d 15, 17-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Goff v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co., 999 So. 2d 684, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Velez v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 9:17-CV-81310, 2019 WL 7837204, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2019).

Historical lack of clarity and the source of confusion

Until recently, however, insureds had little guidance from Florida courts as to whether an insurer’s payment of an appraisal award also triggered Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525’s  thirty-day deadline to file a motion for fees and costs, or whether the insured was first required to move for and await the entry of an actual final judgment. The lack of clarity stems from Rule 1.525’s triggering mechanism: resembling Section 627.428 in requiring the “filing of [a] judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal” but with the additional requirement that such judgment or notice “conclude[] the action as to that party.”

Continue Reading Florida: the time to move for attorney’s fees post-appraisal

This post was also written by Michael N. DiCanio.

Policyholders and their counsel should check out a May 27 ruling denying summary judgment to the insurance company defendants in Bray & Gillespie IX, LLC v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., et ano. In the B&G decision, a magistrate judge in the Middle District of Florida relied in part on the so-called Broad Evidence Rule. Under that rule, any evidence logically tending to establish a correct estimate of the value of damaged or destroyed property may be considered by the trier of fact to determine “actual cash value” at the time of the loss. This means that replacement cost, wholesale cost, a contractor’s estimate, even the owner’s own testimony, are among the many types of evidence that a jury could consider to determine “actual cash value.” The judge in the B&G case characterized the Broad Evidence Rule as a “liberal admissibility standard.”

In the same decision, the magistrate judge suggested that a much tougher evidentiary standard must be met by an insurance company alleging fraud or misrepresentation by a policyholder.

Continue Reading A Tale of Two Evidentiary Standards